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Female Constituency, Electoral Competition, 
and Local Maternity Policy in Korea
Doo-Rae Kim*
Abstract: This study explores the dynamic nature of maternity policy formation
by focusing on the role of the female constituency and electoral competition 
in rendering policy makers, regardless of their gender, more receptive to the
interests of women. The study utilizes original data on maternity policy benefits
collected from local governments in Korea. The results show that a strong
female constituency and intense electoral competition can lead local policy makers
to establish greater maternity benefits. These findings suggest that the electoral
power of women in the citizenry and the political vulnerability of elected officials
constitute alternative channels for female influence on the formation of local
maternity policy in Korea.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been widely accepted that female representation in policy-making institu-
tions and bureaucratic agencies is the most important condition for the formulation
and implementation of public policies that benefit female citizens. One strand of this
representative government theory has examined the link between the gender of elite
policy makers and legislative outcomes (Dolan & Ford, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999;
Swers, 2005). Legislative institutions with greater numbers of female lawmakers are
expected to produce more woman-friendly policies. The other strand of the theory has
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focused on the effect of the gender makeup of bureaucratic organizations on policy
implementation (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty,
2006). Bureaucratic agencies with greater numbers of female officials are expected to
better serve the needs of female citizens. Furthermore, studies have found that the
translation of female representation into women-friendly policy outcomes is contingent
upon women’s power within policy-making institutions (Swers, 2005), the salience of
a policy issue to women’s interests (Dolan, 2000), the feminist mission of an agency
(Kelly & Newman, 2001), and flexible organizational arrangements that allow bureau-
cratic discretion (Keiser et al., 2002).
There is no doubt that this gender-based theory of representative government has
clarified important institutional conditions under which the interests of women can 
be promoted by female officeholders. Yet, the theory is still limited in the following
respects. First, in focusing on the gender profile of government institutions, researchers
tend to downplay the political role played by female citizens in the policy process.
Especially in policy areas where beneficiaries are largely drawn from the female popu-
lation, female constituency groups act to pressure elected officials (Allard, 2004;
Dolan, 1997; Howard, 1992; Skocpol, 1995). Therefore, female representation in
political inputs may also make a substantial difference in the extent to which elected
officials act for female interests in the policy process.
Second, the gender-based theory of representative government has sidelined the
important question of when policy makers, regardless of their gender, become more
receptive to female interests. This weakness becomes evident as we critically examine
the premise that the gender of a policy maker is the principal determinant of his or 
her positions on matters that directly affect female interests. Contrary to the concep-
tion of a gender divide in public decisions, support for female interests can differ not
only across genders but also among individuals of the same gender due to factors 
that cross-cut the gender divide, such as political predisposition, race, and class
(Mouffe, 1995; Pateman, 1989). Because not all male officials are less sympathetic
than their female counterparts to the interests of women, the question of what motivates
policy makers to take a favorable position on gendered issues warrants more cautious
examination.
To add to our knowledge about causal links between gender representation and
policy outputs, this study examines some alternative mechanisms of female influence
in the policy process: the strength of female constituency and the electoral incentives
of government officials. First, when policy benefits are disproportionately concentrated
on the female population, female constituency groups are likely to form and exert a
significant influence on decisions by elected policy makers. Second, when a highly
contested election is anticipated, the incumbent policy makers may weigh female
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votes to enhance their chance of electoral success. These channels of female influence
are not dependent on the gender of policy makers, but they can constrain the decisions
of both male and female officials.
These theoretical possibilities can be adequately tested in policy areas that are
closely related to women’s interests. Previous research has identified a range of such
policy areas, including education, children and family, health care, and social welfare
(Herrnson, Lay, & Stokes, 2003; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Swers, 2005). In this
regard, the case of maternity support programs in Korea provides a good opportunity
to examine whether gender diversity in policy-making institutions, strength of the
female constituency, or electoral competition can advance female policy interests.
Maternity policies can be considered as one of the compassion issues on which a 
gender gap in attitudes among both the mass public and elite politicians is most 
evident (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Swers, 2005).
Maternity support policies have been adopted to address public concern about 
drastically declining fertility in Korea. Local government policy makers perceived the
seriousness of declining local populations earlier than did national government officials.
During the era of rapid economic development in the 1980s, the younger generation’s
migration to urban areas and declining marriage rates and fertility gradually undermined
the socioeconomic sustainability of rural communities (Kim, 1988; Lee & Farber,
1985). As a result, local governments formulated and implemented policies to promote
maternity before the national government did.
In this paper, I attempt to explain local-to-local variation in maternity benefits by
focusing on some alternative channels of female influence in the policy process. The
study is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the local maternity
policy context in Korea. In the theory section, we discuss competing explanations of
the dynamic process by which various political and socioeconomic factors shape 
local maternity policies. Then, empirical analysis is performed with original data on
maternity benefits collected from all 230 local governments in Korea. Finally, the
findings are presented and larger implications are discussed.
LOCAL MATERNITY POLICY IN KOREA
Korea has seen drastically declining fertility over the past decades. The demo-
graphic downturn began in the 1980s, transforming the country into one of the least
reproductive societies in the world at the turn of the new millennium (United Nations,
2007). Rural localities have experienced more severe demographic downturn. During
the era of rapid industrialization, massive rural-urban migration gradually undermined
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the socioeconomic sustainability of rural communities (Kim, 1988; Lee & Farber,
1985). Due to the regional disparity in the redistribution of population, local govern-
ment officials in rural areas perceived the seriousness of the population decline earlier
than did national government officials. Those local governments promptly formulated
and implemented various policy measures to promote maternity within their jurisdictions
prior to the enactment of the national pronatalist policy. After the inception of local
maternity policy in 2002, pronatalist policies rapidly spread among local jurisdictions
in Korea (Kim, n.d., 2010).
Local maternity policies are highly diverse with regard to the type and amount of
benefits as well as eligibility requirements (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family,
2006, 2008). Local maternity support programs distribute two kinds of benefits: child-
birth and child-care support. While the former provides eligible families with immediate
lump-sum assistance, the latter provides monthly assistance for child care for a specific
time period. Local programs differ in terms of the eligible number of children, ranging
from one to five, and the period of support, stretching up to 72 months. The amount of
benefits also varies considerably. For example, childbirth support benefits for the third
child in a family range from none to 5 million Korean won ($4,400), and child-care
support benefits for the entire coverage period for a third child vary from none to 14.4
million won ($12,600).
Why do local governments differ in the generosity of their maternity benefits? 
At first glance, varying degrees of demographic downturn across localities can be con-
sidered as the primary source of local-to-local variation in maternity benefits. That is,
one may contend that maternity benefits are likely to be greater in local jurisdictions
that have experienced more severe problems of declining and low fertility over the
years. Yet, this simplistic view overlooks the confluence of various political and
socioeconomic factors in local-level policy making. Numerous factors affect the ways
that a policy problem is defined, the issue is placed on a formal agenda, and different
policy options are compared during the course of policy formation (Kingdon, 1995;
Stone, 2002).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As outlined in the above section, local governments have set administrative sys-
tems in motion to deliver tangible maternity benefits to boost fertility rates in their
jurisdictions in Korea, and have established various eligibility criteria and benefit
amounts. Why are some local governments more generous than others in providing
maternity benefits? To solve this puzzle, this study starts with the idea of female repre-
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sentation within public institutions and the premise that the gender of government offi-
cials has a substantial effect on policy outcomes. Yet, as will be discussed in detail,
this theoretical explanation may not fully capture the workings of various channels of
female influence on policy formulation, especially via two mechanisms of electoral
politics: the mobilization of the female constituency and electoral competition. Hence,
the study proposes two competing hypotheses linking the electoral power of female
citizens to policy outcomes, constituting alternative channels of female influence.
Female Representation
The theory of representative government can offer a first explanation for the local
variation in the generosity of maternity benefits. Proponents of this theory contend that
the interests of women can be better represented in policy outcomes primarily by
women who hold governmental positions (Keiser et al., 2002; Meier & Nicholson-
Crotty, 2006). In other words, the ‘descriptive’ representation of women in public
institutions is considered a precondition for the achievement of active gender represen-
tation in policy outcomes (Mosher, 1982, pp. 14-17; cf. Pitkin, 1967). This assertion is
grounded on the assumption that government officials are more receptive to the
demands of citizens from similar demographic origins (Meier & Stewart, 1992;
Selden, 1997). Because female officials are expected to use their authority to enhance
the interests of female citizens, a higher degree of female representation in public
institutions is predicted to result in greater policy benefits for women.1
Because maternity policies affect the well-being of women as a group, female 
officials in government institutions are likely to develop shared values and attitudes
about the issue based on their sense of “women as mothers” (Ruddick, 1989; also see
Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). Female voters may expect that female officeholders will
better address women’s concerns, and female politicians also utilize political strategy
emphasizing their better fit to maternity issues (Herrnson et al., 2003). Female legislators
are inclined to meet their constituency’s expectations by establishing formal positions
relevant to women’s issues (Dolan & Ford, 1995) and by actively participating in the
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1. This assertion may be regarded as a traditional feminist approach that perceives gender 
differences and confines attention to a limited range of gendered policy areas. In contrast, a
more recent perspective, gender mainstreaming, which surfaced through the 1995 Beijing
Platform for Action at the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women, emphasizes various
development strategies to achieve gender equality by comprehensively reshaping the
“mainstream” in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation across all domains
of policy issues (for a review, see Walby, 2005, and True, 2003).
formulation of policies that benefit women (Swers, 1998, 2005). In accordance with
the representative government thesis, a positive relationship can be expected between the
number of female officeholders in local policy-making institutions and the generosity
of maternity benefits as follows.
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of female officials in local policy-making institu-
tions will have a positive effect on maternity policy benefits.
Alternative Channels of Female Influence: 
Female Constituency and Electoral Competition
The representative government theory has contributed to a better understanding 
of the origins of feminist policy outcomes. Yet, the theory is still incomplete in that 
it cannot fully explain why and how policies that benefit women could have been 
formulated in highly masculine institutional settings. Several historical narratives have
shown that in many societies, the social and political rights of women have been
achieved by broad feminist movements, not by the transformation of policy-making
institutions (Anderson, 1996; Tilly & Gurin, 1992). Similarly, case studies of social
welfare policy development have also discovered that the enfranchisement of women and
the emergence of female groups have greatly contributed to the successful enactment
of various policies that benefit women (Allard, 2004; Howard, 1992; Skocpol, 1995).
These together suggest that the representative government theory may have unfairly
neglected the importance of the gender makeup of political inputs.
In the area of maternity policy, female citizens are likely to develop a sense of
group interests because they have far greater stakes than male voters in public assis-
tance to maternity (Herrnson et al., 2003). Historically, scholars report that various
pro-maternity policies such as maternal leave and benefits have been successfully
advocated by women’s movement groups (Allard, 2004; Koven & Michel, 1993;
Skocpol, 1995). Female constituency groups’ support for elected policy makers can be
determined by their assessment of these politicians’ positions on maternity issues. This
means that elected policy makers, both women and men, are likely to be pressured by
the presence of female constituents to increase maternity benefits within their jurisdic-
tions. Such electoral dynamics can create an alternative channel through which the
interests of female citizens can be incorporated into the content of maternity policy as
follows.
Hypothesis 2: The size of the female constituency will have a positive effect on
maternity policy benefits.
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The representative government theory also seems to be based on a narrow conception
of the motivation of public officials. Its core assumption is that public officials may
behave differently when dealing with citizens of the same demographic origin. How-
ever, unlike this gender-based behavioral assumption, the larger literature on electoral
politics has presumed that elected policy makers take policy positions strategically in
pursuing political goals such as reelection (Fiorina, 1989; Hall, 1996; Mayhew, 1974).
Such political incentives for elected officials can have discernable policy consequences,
because those policy makers can use their power to formulate policies as a means to
cultivate support from a broad set of voters. Research has shown that elected policy
makers tend to become more generous in making decisions on policy benefits espe-
cially when they are confronted with a greater electoral challenge that makes their
political standing more vulnerable (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Dye,
1984; Jennings, 1979; Kim, 2008).
If a policy issue becomes salient to the female electorate and a highly contested
election is anticipated, then incumbent policy makers are likely to weigh the political
value of female votes and attempt to increase support from women by addressing 
that issue. In the case of local maternity policies, elected policy makers facing greater
electoral competition, regardless of their gender, may have stronger motivation to
manipulate maternity benefits to appeal to female constituents for the attainment of
maximum political gains. Therefore, a positive association is expected between the
degree of electoral competition and the generosity of maternity benefits, constituting
another mechanism of female influence in the policy process, as follows.
Hypothesis 3: Electoral competition will have a positive effect on maternity
policy benefits.
Other Socioeconomic Factors
Although the focus of this study is on mechanisms of female influence in the policy
process, other political and social factors may also affect the formation of maternity
policies. First, policy makers may try harder to solve a more pressing social problem.
Indicators of detrimental effects of a policy problem on communities can arouse public
concerns (Anderson, 2010; Kingdon, 1995), thereby prompting public officials to take
action to mitigate these effects (Stone, 2002). When maternity policy benefits are seen
as an instrumental response by local governments to address public concerns about
declining population and fertility, the following can be expected.
Hypothesis 4: Maternity policy benefits will be greater in local jurisdictions that
have experienced a more drastic decline in population.
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Next, ideological leanings of local residents can affect policy outcomes because the
political orientations of the general public constitute important policy environments
(Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Hill,
Leighley, & Hinton-Anderson, 1995). Local officials are likely to react to the local
political atmosphere in formulating policies; government officials in liberal localities,
as opposed to conservative ones, tend to be more responsive to the demands of disad-
vantaged social groups. Regarding the generosity of maternity policies, policy makers
in liberal localities are more likely to support programs that are tailored to the well-
being of women. Hence, we can expect the following regarding the effect of local
political orientations.
Hypothesis 5: Maternity policy benefits will be greater in local jurisdictions
where the general public is liberal in political orientation.
Finally, the fiscal capacity of local government is an important factor that defines
the bounds of policy makers’ decisions on programs that expand the range of recipients
of public assistance (Plotnick & Winters, 1985; Tweedie, 1994). Local governments
cannot add a new program to the existing list of spending items without considering
future fiscal constraints. Because the fiscal capacities of local governments are greatly
constrained by economic conditions within their jurisdictions, local maternity benefits
are expected to be greater when economic and fiscal conditions are better.
Hypothesis 6: Maternity policy benefits will be greater in local jurisdictions that
are economically prosperous.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
This study analyzes why and how local governments differ in their policy responses
to the problem of declining and low fertility in Korea. Two sets of dependent variables
are constructed to measure local variation in maternity benefits. Childbirth supports
are measured by the amount of the lump-sum payments to families for a first, second,
third, fourth, and fifth childbirth. Child-care supports are measured by the total amount
of child-care assistance that is promised to a family that has a first, second, third, fourth,
and fifth child. The dependent variables are given in 2008 values. The data for these
measures were obtained from 230 local governments in Korea via the procedures
mandated by the Administrative Information Disclosure Act.
Several independent variables are constructed to measure various factors constituting
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local policy environments surrounding the maternity policy issue. First, to test the 
representative government hypothesis (H1), the degree of female representation within
local policy-making institutions is measured by the female seats variable, which is the
percentage of seats occupied by women in local legislatures.2 According to the gender
representation theory, this variable is expected to have a positive effect on maternity
benefits. Second, to test female citizens’ political influence on maternity benefits (H2),
female constituency, the percentage of women in the total voting-age (19 and older)
population in each local jurisdiction, is noted.3 Third, to examine the consequence of
electoral dynamics (H3), electoral competition is measured by the difference between
the percentages of votes received by the winner and the runner-up in the most recent
mayoral election. This measure is reversed (100% minus the winner’s electoral margin),
so that a greater value represents a higher level of electoral competition; this variable
is expected to have a positive impact on the dependent variables.
Other variables are also created to examine the effects of citizen ideology, the
severity of the policy problem, and the economic condition of the locality. To examine
the effect of local citizens’ ideological leanings, citizen liberalism is measured as the
percentage of votes that went to the Democratic Labor Party, the most liberal party in
Korea, in the latest local party-list election. The severity of the demographic downturn
at the local level is measured by population (the logged number of local residents),
change in population (over five years), total fertility rate (number of live births per
fertile woman), birthrate (live births per 1,000 local residents), and change in birthrate
(over five years). These variables should have negative effects on maternity benefits
because policy makers will be less concerned when there is a growing population,
higher total fertility rate, and increasing birthrate. To control for the aging of local 
populations, elderly dependence is measured by the ratio of population aged 65 and
over to population aged 15-64 in each local jurisdiction, with an expectation of a positive
impact on maternity benefits.
Economic conditions in a locality may determine the fiscal resources it can devote
to maternity support programs. This study uses the variables gross regional product,
the log-transformed gross regional production in each provincial or metropolitan 
jurisdiction, fiscal capacity of local government, measured by per capita local tax, and
companies, the logged number of companies in each locality, which represents the
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2. Although the policy-making power of executive heads is also substantial, a measure for a
gender profile of the executive heads was excluded due to the lack of variation in the number
of female mayors.
3. This variable is chosen because it better represents the electoral power of female citizens
than some alternative measures, including the proportion of fertile women aged 15-49.
level of economic development. As a measure of economic hardship, the welfare
households variable, the number of households receiving welfare benefits per 1,000
local residents, is also included in the equation.
Finally, to control for the gap in demographic conditions between metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas, two dummy variables—rural, which indicates townships
in rural areas (gun), and metropolitan, which indicates autonomous districts in metro-
politan areas (gu)—are created. The base for this set of dummy variables is municipali-
ties in nonmetropolitan areas (si). Since the Korean population has increasingly been
concentrated in the metropolitan cities, maternity benefits are expected to be greater in
nonmetropolitan areas. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in this study. Descriptive
statistics for these variables are given in the appendix.
130 Female Constituency, Electoral Competition, and Local Maternity Policy in Korea
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 1. Variables and Measurements
Variables Description of measurement Hypothesis
Dependent variables
Childbirth support (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Immediate benefits for childbirth for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th child
Child-care support (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Total child-care benefits for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th child
Independent variables
Female seats Percentage of seats occupied by women in each local H1 (+)legislature
Female constituency Percentage of female voters in total voting-age population H2 (+)in each local jurisdiction
Electoral competition Reverse of winner’s electoral margin (100% minus margin) H3 (+)in the latest mayoral election
Citizen liberalism Percentage of votes for the Democratic Labor Party H4 (+)candidate in the last local election
Population (ln) Population in each local jurisdiction (logged) H5 (–)
Change in population Change in population over 5 years in each local jurisdiction H5 (–)
Total fertility rate Number of live births per fertile woman in each local H5 (–)jurisdiction
Birthrate Number of live births per 1,000 local residents H5 (–)
Change in birthrate Change in birthrate over 5 years in each local jurisdiction H5 (–)
Elderly dependence Ratio of the 65-and-older population to the 15-64-year-old H5 (+)population in each local jurisdiction
Gross regional product (ln) Gross regional product (logged) in each provincial or H6 (+)metropolitan jurisdiction 
FINDINGS
The theory of representative government contends that the interests of women are
better served during the policy process by female officials within government institu-
tions. In addition to this widely known channel of representation for women, the present
study attempts to test for the effectiveness of other mechanisms of active representa-
tion for women in the policy process. It has been proposed that the presence of a larger
female constituency and a higher level of electoral competition can render policy 
makers, regardless of their gender, more receptive to the influence of women in the
citizenry, thereby promoting the attainment of women’s interests in the policy forma-
tion process. In this section, these theoretical possibilities are empirically examined by
conducting cross-sectional analyses on local variation in Korea in the two kinds of
maternity benefits, childbirth and child-care support.
Local Childbirth Support Benefits
Table 2 presents the results for local childbirth support benefits. To explore the policy
effect of gender diversity within government institutions, the female seats variable can
be examined. The female representation theory predicts that the gender of public offi-
cials does matter in determining policies that benefit female citizens and the presence
of a substantial number of female officials leads to decisions to provide greater benefits
for maternity. Contrary to this theoretical expectation, the analysis result shows a 
lack of significant influence by the proportion of female legislators on the amount of
childbirth support benefits. Coefficients on female seats are not statistically significant
at all across different equations for the first to fifth child of a family. This means that
the degree of female representation within local policy-making institutions (that is,
local legislatures) does not make any discernible difference in determining the amount
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Variables Description of measurement Hypothesis
Fiscal capacity Per capita local tax in each local jurisdiction H6 (+)
Companies (ln) Number of companies (logged) in each local jurisdiction H6 (+)
Welfare households Number of households receiving welfare benefits per H6 (+)1,000 local residents
Controls
Rural Townships in rural areas
Metropolitan Autonomous districts in metropolitan areas 
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Table 2. OLS Analysis of Local Childbirth Support Benefits in Korea
Variables
Childbirth support
1st child 2nd child 3rd child 4th child 5th child
Female seats 1.935 1.868 -6.165 -0.326 2.223(1.431) (2.724) (6.336) (8.171) (9.265)
Female constituency -0.439 51.852* 220.486** 283.166*** 322.424**(18.928) (30.084) (72.365) (79.188) (114.216)
Electoral competition 0.851 2.652** 3.047* 7.696** 10.480**(0.554) (0.554) (3.047) (3.204) (3.935)
Citizen liberalism -7.176** -2.091 43.107** 36.458* 38.429*(2.281) (4.925) (16.506) (16.989) (17.544)
Population (ln) -16.233 -170.267* -690.121** -766.680*** -834.931**(40.190) (74.883) (246.282) (236.369) (288.365)
Change in population -2.585* -1.153 6.576 7.289 6.614(1.323) (2.850) (6.014) (6.274) (6.994)
Total fertility rate 112.005 56.445 -374.333 -218.186 -205.568(183.126) (294.571) (651.214) (714.186) (881.225)
Birthrate -2.727 0.292 -3.870 -21.639 -70.564(15.099) (27.188) (60.277) (68.803) (82.862)
Change in birthrate 21.357* 13.578 71.398 120.984* 155.166*(11.403) (22.510) (68.739) (72.179) (77.566)
Elderly dependence 8.000* 13.247* 23.290 8.942 -4.358(4.534) (6.739) (20.012) (21.075) (24.198)
Gross regional product (ln) -27.115* 24.707 135.602* 148.619* 165.263*(14.340) (27.870) (67.349) (76.254) (90.446)
Fiscal capacity -0.018 0.049 0.018 1.288** 2.447**(0.083) (0.212) (0.524) (0.542) (0.989)
Companies (ln) -4.511 100.609 635.204** 790.051*** 1,010.189***(35.596) (76.464) (233.269) (225.904) (288.444)
Welfare households per 1,000 -2.358* -3.738* -6.480 -2.733 1.947(1.246) (1.947) (4.440) (4.929) (5.711)
Rural 64.457 161.257* 171.109 -116.634 -225.617(51.499) (75.038) (199.053) (213.006) (229.632)
Metropolitan 30.612 64.328 -306.785 -505.592 -580.669*(57.284) (91.655) (270.135) (291.729) (321.219)
Constant 604.457 -2,187.832 -10,988.780** -14,865.320*** -18,640.880**(1,004.789) (1,708.201) (3,939.959) (4,345.436) (6,030.997)
Number of observations 230 230 230 230 230
R-square 0.354 0.295 0.288 0.277 0.261
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests)
of childbirth support benefits across local jurisdictions.
Even when female representation within public institutions does not effectively
shape policy decisions on maternity benefits, there are alternative channels for female
influence which affect the way that elected officials, regardless of their sex, formulate
policies for women. Both the strength of the female constituency and the level of 
electoral competition turn out to be significant factors. More specifically, female 
constituency is significant in exerting a positive influence on the amount of childbirth
benefits for a family having a second to fifth child. This finding lends support to the
competing hypothesis that the electoral power of women in the citizenry, as opposed
to the sheer number of female officials, induces the formation of a gendered policy by
constraining both male and female officials’ decisions. The effect is estimated to be
highly significant: a one-unit increase in the percentage of women in the local population
is estimated to have a positive effect of as much as 51,852 won, 220,486 won, 283,166
won, and 322,424 won, respectively, on the childbirth benefit for a second, third,
fourth, and fifth child.
The effects of electoral competition also consistently support the proposition that
the electoral incentives of policy makers influence policy decisions that benefit female
constituents. This variable is estimated to have positive effects on childbirth benefits: a
one-standard-deviation increase in electoral competition (17.76) tends to increase
maternity benefits by as much as 47,099 won (= 2,652*17.76) for a second child,
54,110 won (= 3,047*17.76) for a third child, 138,460 won (= 7,796*17.76) for a
fourth child, and 186,160 won (= 10,480*17.76) for a fifth child. These results suggest
that local policy makers facing greater political challenge are likely to support maternity
policies in order to cultivate political support from female voters.
Other socioeconomic factors are expected to have an effect on local childbirth sup-
port benefits. Citizen liberalism turns out to be significant in increasing the maternity
benefits for a third, fourth, or fifth child, thereby supporting the hypothesis: a 1 percent
increase in votes for the Democratic Labor Party is associated with an increase in
childbirth benefits by as much as 43,107 won, 36,458 won, and 38,429 won for a
third, fourth, and fifth child, respectively. Regarding the severity of the policy problem,
population (ln) has a negative effect on the level of childbirth benefits, as predicted by
the hypothesis: a 1 percent increase in local population is estimated to reduce childbirth
benefits by 170,267 won, 690,121 won, 766,680 won, and 834,931 won for a second
to fifth child, respectively. Economic factors also matter for maternity benefits, as 
the hypothesis predicted. The variables gross regional product (ln) and companies (ln)
are estimated to have a positive effect on the amount of childbirth support benefits,
especially for the third to fifth child of a family. A 1 percent increase in gross regional
product tends to increase benefits by as much as 135,602 to 165,263 won, and a 1 
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percent increase in the number of companies tends to increase benefits by 635,204 to
1,010,189 won.
In sum, the primary findings shown in table 2 indicate that the degree of female
representation within local policy-making institutions cannot account for local varia-
tion in the generosity of childbirth support benefits. Despite the fact that childbirth
support policies may enhance the interests of female citizens, there is no significant
association between the gender of policy makers and the amount of maternity benefits.
Yet, when the role of female representation is limited, this analysis demonstrates 
that alternative channels for the active representation of women, which affect both
male and female policy makers’ behavior, are crucial in shaping local maternity policy.
The findings collectively confirm that the strength of the female constituency and the
electoral incentives of the incumbent policy makers significantly contribute to the 
provision of greater childbirth benefits.
Local Child-Care Support Benefits
Table 3 summarizes the results of the analysis of local variation in child-care 
support benefits. The findings show that the strength of the female constituency is the
factor that has, as expected, the most consistently positive effect on child-care benefits
across different equations. However, other channels of female influence, such as the
proportion of female legislators and electoral competition, are not consistent with
expectations in terms of their effects on the generosity of childbirth benefits.
First, the hypothesis of representative government is not consistently supported.
The effects of the female seats variable are mixed at best: this variable has a positive
effect on child-care benefits for a second child, but it has an unexpectedly negative
effect on benefits for a fourth and fifth child. Combined with the lack of any significant
link between the degree of female representation within local policy-making institutions
and the amount of childbirth support benefits, this result suggests that the generosity of
maternity benefits is not determined by the gender profile of local policy-making 
institutions in Korea.
It has also been hypothesized that when female representation within government
institutions fails to formulate greater policy benefits for women, other channels of
female influence that can shape the behavioral patterns of public officials, regardless
of their gender, can enhance female citizens’ interests in policy. An alternative channel
is the electoral competition that policy makers are likely to face, which may increase
the political value of female votes. The preceding analysis of childbirth support 
benefits has confirmed this theoretical expectation by showing a positive association
between electoral competition and the amount of benefits. Yet, when this variable is
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Table 3. OLS Analysis of Local Child-Care Support Benefits in Korea
Variables
Child-Care Support
1st child 2nd child 3rd child 4th child 5th child
Female seats 3.953 8.049* -27.886(2.596) (4.441) (20.949)
Female constituency 47.998 132.294* 692.844**(31.192) (66.608) (284.465)
Electoral competition -1.099 -2.671 -23.346**(0.839) (1.975) (9.504)
Citizen liberalism -7.495* -20.578* 84.744*(3.255) (9.306) (45.199)
Population (ln) -6.288 -87.247 -1,452.679*(59.239) (99.714) (646.211)
Change in population -3.304 -4.526 68.172**(2.339) (3.843) (27.119)
Total fertility rate -1,031.278** 1,780.696** 1,661.711(389.556) (636.812) (2,023.547)
Birthrate -70.741* -105.327* -162.802(31.154) (47.948) (185.895)
Change in birthrate 61.593*** 14.046 -135.372(19.264) (63.468) (165.823)
Elderly dependence -6.550 -20.024* 73.075(4.436) (11.737) (57.672)
Gross regional product (ln) 42.467 104.642 555.847**(35.001) (69.513) (222.615)
Fiscal capacity 0.060 0.066 -3.316*(0.183) (0.267) (1.673)
Companies (ln) 19.073 110.326 1,243.767*(66.905) (99.809) (587.547)
Welfare households per 1,000 0.480 6.361 -6.825(2.002) (6.021) (14.499)
Rural 80.956 -3.307 -262.492(56.466) (163.968) (494.235)
Metropolitan 176.998* 139.071 -473.891(92.303) (165.622) (661.844)
Constant -3,736.296** -9,332.417* -38,017.800**(1,590.588) (4,112.104) (14,670.540)
Number of observations 230 230 230 230 230
R-square 0.210 0.172 0.304 0.270 0.268
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.





































































examined in connection with child-care support benefits, the electoral competition
hypothesis is not supported at all. Unlike the hypothesized relationship, negative coef-
ficients on electoral competition indicate that a higher level of electoral competition
tends to decrease child-care benefits, especially for the third to fifth child.
In contrast, the results consistently support the hypothesis that the presence of a
larger female constituency can lead local policy makers to provide greater maternity
benefits. Coefficients on the female constituency variable mean that a 1 percent
increase in the size of the female constituency in a local jurisdiction tends to increase
the amount of child-care benefits by as much as 132,294 won, 692,844 won, 544,588
won, and 534,655 won for the second, third, fourth, and fifth child of a family,
respectively. Together with the preceding evidence for the effect of this mechanism
on childbirth benefits, it is clear that this variable performs consistently across benefit
types for maternity support. Hence, one can conclude that the electoral mobilization 
of female citizens can overcome the gender divide in policy formulation by placing
pressure on elected officials, regardless of their sex, to address the concerns of women.
Turning to other factors, it is found that the ideological leanings of local residents
significantly affect the amount of local maternity benefits. Citizen liberalism has a
positive effect on child-care benefits: a 1 percent increase in votes for the Democratic
Labor Party is associated with an increase of 84,744 won, 105,817 won, and 105,028
won in the amount of child-care benefits for the third to fifth child of a family. It is
also shown that the amount of child-care support benefits is smaller in localities where
the problem of demographic downturn is less severe, and it is greater in localities
where economic conditions are better. Negative coefficients on population (ln) indicate
that a 1 percent increase in the size of the local population tends to decrease the
amount of child-care benefits by as much as 1,452,679 to 1,521,791 won for the third
to fifth child of a family. Furthermore, a 1 percent increase in gross regional product is
associated with an increase in child-care benefits of as much as 555,841 to 592,203
won for the third to fifth child. And a 1 percent increase in the number of companies is
estimated to increase child-care benefits by as much as 1,234,767 to 1,258,051 won
for a third to fifth child.
Overall, the empirical patterns reported in tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the
strength of the female constituency has the most consistently positive effect on both
childbirth and child-care benefits. Electoral competition has the expected effect on
childbirth benefits but not on child-care benefits. Gender diversity within local legisla-
tures turns out to be the least influential factor and does not have any effect on either
benefit. These results together suggest that the mobilization of female interests and
political competition among elected policy makers can constitute alternative channels
through which female citizens can advance their issues to policy decisions even if
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female officeholders in government institutions are not sufficiently empowered to 
protect women’s interests during the formation of public policies.
CONCLUSION
This study has examined how the interests of women are translated into policy out-
puts in the context of local maternity support policies in Korea. It clearly shows that
the proportion of women in local policy-making institutions plays a very limited role
in forming maternity policies in Korea. This finding may be surprising to those who
have regarded gender equality in government as the key facilitator of the translation of
women’s interests into greater policy benefits for female citizens. However, this study
is not the first to show that the enactment of policies that benefit women has not been
dependent upon an advance of female officials in number and power within public
organizations in Korea. Prior research has shown that women’s rights have successfully
been incorporated into national legislation due primarily to the strategic mobilization
of female voters and groups, while female representation in elected institutions and
bureaucratic organizations has remained very low in Korea (e.g., Lee, 1996; Lee &
Chin, 2007).
How can policies for women be enacted if women inside public institutions are not
sufficiently empowered to represent female interests? The results of this study provide
strong empirical support for the theoretical expectation that there are alternative chan-
nels of female representation through which elite policy makers and female citizens
interact. This study highlights the ways that elected policy makers, regardless of gender,
are pressured to become more attentive to the concerns of women. Even when the
political base of women inside policy-making institutions remains weak and, hence,
important policy decisions are made in mostly masculine institutional arrangements,
the mobilization of female constituents on the one hand and electoral competition on
the other hand can create political conditions that foster a significant association
between elected policy makers’ decisions and the intensity of women’s interests in a
polity.
These two mechanisms of female influence are clearly distinct from that of gender
equality in the composition of government institutions. First, the alternative channels
of female representation operate on the input side of the political process. Female 
constituency groups can mobilize political resources to enlarge the space for women’s
issues in the government agenda and help prioritize policies that benefit women. This
study confirms that the dynamics of interest mobilization for women can substantially
affect the results of the local policy-making process. Second, these channels of female
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representation can constrain the ways that both female and male officeholders deal
with gendered policy issues. If the attainment of gender equality in government is 
limited, then it is important for advocates of women’s issues to cultivate support 
from male officeholders who are predominant in number and influence within policy-
making institutions. This study suggests that electoral competition creates a window of
opportunity to advance women’s issues in the policy process.
Hence, the findings of this study suggest that maternity policy formulation can be
understood as a process that is constrained by the confluence of universal factors that
may be at work across a broad range of policy domains. As discussed above, the local
maternity policy domain under study has attributes that may bring about a gender
divide among public officials within policy-making institutions. Nonetheless, this policy
domain seems to be characterized primarily by such universal factors as the influence
of the policy target population and the political motivations of elected policy makers,
which can apply to other policy areas besides the maternity issue in decentralized policy
systems (Hill et al., 1995; Im, 2002; Kim, 2008, 2011).
Finally, a larger implication stemming from this study is that the process of repre-
sentative democracy can be considered as conducive to the formation of policies that
promote women’s interests in the policy process. Even in a polity, such as Korea,
where public organizations are still dominated by male officials and limited in rendering
discernible policy effects for women, the normal politics of interest mobilization and
electoral competition can function as vital agents for making masculine policy-making
institutions more receptive to the demands of women.
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
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Gross regional product (ln)
Fiscal capacity
Companies (ln)
Welfare households (per 1,000)
Rural
Metropolitan
Note: N = 230 for all variables.
105.87
225.35
285.95
559.00
593.78
60.52
133.04
1,002.90
935.08
941.55
14.79
49.85
76.23
11.89
11.81
-0.82
1.35
9.18
-0.12
21.55
17.97
80.92
9.12
44.69
0.32
0.30
195.35
328.21
837.38
896.71
1,044.46
375.43
681.79
2,675.23
2,644.22
2,652.58
7.07
0.97
17.76
4.78
1.00
11.04
0.26
2.22
1.17
12.15
0.75
84.35
0.97
23.33
0.47
0.46
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
46.96
0.00
4.81
9.22
-18.55
0.84
5.50
-4.80
5.68
16.87
23.49
6.96
7.31
0.00
0.00
1,000.00
2,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,300.00
4,200.00
6,000.00
14,400.00
14,400.00
14,400.00
46.15
52.57
100.00
42.43
13.88
63.91
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4.80
50.49
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884.78
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